Publication §1: Historical Constructivism and the Bulgarian Council of EU Presidency: Policy Externalization towards the Eastern Partnership


Historical Constructivism and the Bulgarian Council of EU Presidency: Policy Externalization towards the Eastern Partnership, Teodor Kalpakchiev,

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(All content must be properly cited. Originally published by the University of Plovdiv in a collection of studies on the Bulgarian 10 years’ EU membership anniversary.)


The paper presents a historical constructivism argument for Bulgaria’s involvement in the Eastern Partnership matter. Subsequently it explains the developments of the ENP I and II (to be updated with ENP III). It then uses a polling method to gather opinions on certain stances related to the Bulgarian Council of EU Presidency and the Eastern Partnership of the EU, which are presented graphically and analysed. Then, a comparison between the most pressing policy problems in Bulgaria and the Eastern partnership is presented. Overlaps are discussed in lieu of Bulgaria’s stances towards the programming of the ENP and its leadership in the Eastern Partnership. The paper argues that commonalities in the region require similar solutions and the Council of EU Presidency is the platform, where Bulgaria can reveal these dependencies (related to corruption, state capture, energy governance, finances).


Neighbourhood, Corruption, Diversification, Security, Bulgaria


After the fall of communism, the countries behind the Iron Curtain were reestablished as loosely shaped structures with anarchic intra- and interstate relations. Different paths of economic development, reconstruction of national identities and variability in institution building were brought together only after the exponential “Big Bang” Enlargement of the European Union. For Bulgaria has been among the traditional backbenchers, the lessons learned during its first 10 years of membership prove vital for the further integration eastwards.

Context and Methodology

The disillusionment with the absence of reforms and the increasing political scandals, Bulgarians and Ukrainians took the streets in 2013-2014. This paper attempts to abridge domestic predicaments in Bulgaria with the stalemate in the Eastern Partnership and argues that Bulgaria can upload transferrable solutions through its Council of EU Presidency. Its analytical framework relies on a poll consisting of 16 questions scaled with five possible measurements, as well as two questions directed preferences for policy priorities, whereby the 39 respondents[i] had to choose four out of ten possible answers.

Theoretical assumptions

As Ted Hopf points out, state identities in world politics are the product of social practices at home and as such enable state identity, actions and interests abroad.[ii] As a result of the Bulgarian multi-ethnic heritage the construction of a state identity becomes subjected to a revision of historical interpretations that may otherwise result in societal cleavages. Then, its reproduction of “intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors” domestically could be turned into internationally legitimate practices with a degree of predictability[iii]. Their implementation has two important prerequisites – the existence of common structural contexts with the subject, as well as a shared collective identity (e.g. based commonness or a threat) with states that can form a coalition[iv]. At the same time, a policy entrepreneur, in that case Bulgaria, must conform with the “logic of appropriateness” defined by social norms and institutional rules, as well as those of the international community[v]. For being a relatively minimalist state, it could rely much more on epistemic communities[vi] to utilize and maximize its stake in the realization of particular policy project in the Eastern Partnership countries. Institutions (to be read sets of rules and norms) can penetrate into Bulgarian foreign policy, the articulation of it, common platforms, etc. revealing thus that Europeanization must not simply be a reflex to a lack of alternatives, but a holistic effort[vii]. Due to the shared history in the period between antiquity and the middle ages, as well as during the latter part of the 20th century, the interests and the behaviour of their actors and institutions Bulgaria and the frontrunners from the Eastern Partnership will be framed in a framework of historical constructivism. My argument is that, while the immediate past has resulted in a feigned form of statehood and democracy, the common distant past can serve as an engine for institutional learning and policy transfer.

The Evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy

In terms of programming, the ENP has functioned both as an extension and Ersatz for further aggrandizement of the EU. The Enlargement policy of the latter has largely been defined as the “a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms”[viii], aimed at “the reversal, if not the total elimination of the democratic deficits or illiberal traits”[ix], as well as the externalities of economic transformation. It is marked by deepening and widening of “downloaded” policy patterns safeguarded by the pacta sunt servanda principle[x]. The pragmatic management of the policy is achieved through the employment of the conditionality principle, resp. giving rewards for achievements, which in the case of European Neighbourhood Policy is enhanced through “naming and shaming”, resp. negative conditionality. Beyond aid, legal approximation and market opening, the ENP relies largely on socialization through the EuroNEST parliamentary assembly, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and the penultimate reward – freedom of movement of persons, tightly intertwined with the hybrid Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreements, which include numerous stipulations on improvement of governance.

Historically, the ENP has begun with the Barcelona Declaration for a Euro Mediterranean Partnership (11.1995) that focused on democracy export to MENA blended with economic rationales. While the policy entrepreneurs in this case were France and Spain, the UK and Denmark came up with a separate “New Neighbours Initiative” meant to address the countries standing beneath the eastern external border of EU with a strategic focus on Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in April 2002, which was elaborated by Poland in November the same year. Thus, although a “proximity policy” was already mentioned in the Enlargement strategies, the first official communication from the Commission came only in 2003[xi]. It aimed, in lieu with the (old) Security Strategy, to bring about a belt of stability and prosperity that can now be interpreted as a buffer of and testing site for EU’s foreign policy. It delivered bilateral enhancement of the regional approach towards the neighbourhood, expansion of its geographical scope, as well as rationalization of overlapping instruments (TAIEX, SIGMA, TACIS, MEDA, TEMPUS, etc.). For having already begun to overcome the externalities of its economic and political transition, Russia neglected the offer to join the ENP and was subsequently reproached with the “Four Common Spaces”[xii], which relied on a roadmap with no conditionality (in contrast with the Association and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements). The main building block of rewards (in the scientific debate “carrots”) was market access through (enhanced) FTAs and increased allocations through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility. Beyond regional programs funded through the ENPI, concerns such as democracy and human rights (EIDHR), nuclear safety (INSC), poverty and development (DCI) and financial stability (IfS)[xiii] were also targeted.

At large, the ENP has lived through three stages, which can be described as a transition from an ambitious regional approach towards democracy building and overall leverage through an agenda underpinned by the fragility in the Middle East and North Africa and implemented by means of comprehensive strategies to the current pragmatic focus on governance, individual strategies towards each country and differentiation according to the achieved results. With respect to the specific focus of the paper it Eastern Partnership of the EU was largely influenced by the agendas of the Polish, Swedish, Czech and Lithuanian Council of EU Presidencies and came into being after 2008.

Due to the exclusion of Russia for long it was not clear whether the idea of the policy is the expansionist assimilation of the countries, or simply the establishment of a strategic partnership. Most recently, esp. after the redefinition of the UN’s Development Goals and the revision of the Cotonou agreement, the scientific debate has switched towards establishing partnership of equals, whereby the subjects of the policy have increased rights over the “ownership” of its programming. Additionally, the state-centric approach gradually transitioned to focus on building non-state actor’s capacity. In contrast with the Enlargement policy, the absence of the membership reward resulted in asymmetrical, selective and piecemeal rule adoption and application[xiv], which was further fragmented by the inconsistent application of negative conditionality[xv]. The break with the “one size fits all” policy was achieved in 2015[xvi], as the best performers in the East were awarded more aid through the umbrella financing of the policy, accession to the common market through the signing of Deep and Comprehensive FTAs, as well as, partially, freedom of movement of persons. The biggest stalemate in the policy has been triggered by the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, Donetsk, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia. Their maintenance is dependent on the stake of pro-Russian fractions and puts EU’s conflict resolution, peacebuilding and diplomatic capacity at an important test. The solution of these conflicts holds the key towards potential enlargement to the East.

Hence ENP has been initially assessed as a high-profile, but low valence attempt at establishing democracy in North Africa, which has no traditions in that area. Later, its purely economic stimuli proved inadequate due to insufficient financing and the large geographical scope. The competing claims of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as China through its One Belt, One Road initiative have only increased the stakes for EU’s ability to successfully program the extension of its Enlargement policy. The ENP has thus become prototypical example of structural foreign policy[xvii] that includes transfer of values through socializing and normative approximation through “selective extension of the EU’s norms, rules and policies”[xviii] and institution building.  Despite its attempts at differentiation, such has been achieved barely in the third revision of the policy in 2015, as before it was assessed as “driven by a desire for standardization and homogeneity and for asserting the EU’s hierarchical position”[xix].

The scientific debate has had a strong influence in not only explaining and assessing EU’s interventions, but also in contriving conceptual innovations. Within the domain of foreign policy, the EU was initially explained as a “civilian power”, which protects the fundamental rights of humans and attempts to maintain peace around the world. Since then, the concepts of “market power”[xx] and “normative power”[xxi] have taken the lead in defining the corporeity of EU’s foreign policy, which is playing a significant role in structuring globalization.

Bulgarians and the Eastern Partnership

The scientific debate over the early history of the Bulgarian statehood is currently shifting towards theories preferring explanations of their genealogy confined in the eastern European, resp. West-Eurasian locality. This is both because the ethnical depiction of the nation has ever since been influenced by the rise of Russian Slavophilism, which emphasized starkly the Slavic origins in the first official History of Bulgaria[xxii], as well as because the impact of the proto-Bulgarians on the indigenous Thracian and migrant Slavs has been overlooked[xxiii]. Although early settlements might include the Balhara Kingdom in today’s Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, as well as today’s Armenia, evidences for socio-cultural heritage are much ampler in the Eastern Partnership of the EU. To begin with, Old Great Bulgaria was founded on the territory of the currently occupied Crimea and Eastern Ukraine and Odessa (170 166) was one of the early place d’armes towards the Danube. To the north of Georgia, we may find the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (112 924) and in Moldova (67 630) there is a pronounced minority of Bulgarians resettled during the Ottoman rule. One can’t also forego the fact that the Chuvash (1 637 094), Volga Tatars (5 310 649) and Karakalpaks (4466) in Russia have alternating, yet existent ethnical affiliation with the Bolghar tribes. In short, the Eastern trajectory of the Bulgaria foreign policy has been triggered by a historical necessity to extend the founding value of European unity.

After 2014, when the complete study was conducted and distributed to policy makers, two of them – the ex-president Plevneliev and MEP Mariya Gabriel became fervent supporters of the Eastern Partnership, resp. through voicing stark opinions towards the Crimean question and becoming a rapporteur on the visa liberalization with Georgia and Ukraine. The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to its financial constraints, has been active through disbursing scholarships and delivering lecturers in the target countries. However, there is no mention of a Bulgarian non-state actor involved in the preparation of the EU’s Global Strategy[xxiv]. Due to the intricate relationship between the MFA and the executive the Bulgarian state was also not represented at the 23. Ministerial Council of the OSCE, which dealt almost exclusively with the Ukrainian question. These examples can only serve as a reference of a complete, yet limited ownership of policy entrepreneurship by the state, which hinders the potential diversity of policy proposals, as well as the potential erection of epistemic networks. With the new president-elect, the last echo of a pro-integration stance has been dulled.

Empirical Data

Statement Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1. I see only negative sides from Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union? 5% 5% 18% 33% 39%
2. There are direct effects of the recent events in Egypt and Ukraine in Bulgaria. 21% 28% 33% 12% 5%
3. There is a interrelationship between the governmental instability in Bulgaria and Ukraine. 5% 21% 28% 31% 15%
4. Politicians have learned a lesson from the protests in Bulgaria and the situations will improve. 2% 13% 26% 18% 41%
5. There are numerous ways for a small country to be influential within the European Union. 26% 26% 28% 10% 10%
6. In the next legislature period in EU /2014-2020/ the significance of Bulgaria’s position will increase. 2% 8% 41% 31% 18%
7. I understand well what is the European Neighbourhood Policy. 23% 33% 15% 21% 8%
8. Russia’s actions can be defined as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. 36% 28% 8% 20% 8%
9. Protests against governments is the only efficient way to defy state capture in the region. 10% 23% 33% 26% 8%
10. The increased representation of Eurosceptic and far-right parties contributes to the democratic nature of the European Union. 10% 8% 31% 33% 18%
11. The Presidency of Council of the European Union that Bulgaria will hold in 2018 is a viable opportunity to solve domestic problems in the country. 3% 36% 33% 18% 13%
12. The European Neighbourhood Policy poses a challenge to the inefficient coordination of foreign policy in the European Union. 10% 41% 34% 10% 5%
13. There are no enlargement perspectives towards the countries that are taking part the Eastern Partnership. 8% 20% 26% 36% 10%
14. I see no security threats for Bulgaria as a result of the disturbances in the Middle East. 13% 15% 21% 23% 28%
15. Only economic interests of certain member states in the EU matter when it is dealing with the European Neighbourhood Policy. 13% 18% 23% 23% 23%
16. I see that as an external border of the EU and a country in the Black Sea Region Bulgaria will have to increase its maritime security expenditures. 10% 31% 23% 28% 8%


Figure 1. Domestic Priorities in Bulgaria According to Respondents (2014)


Figure 2. Preferences for Priorities of the Bulgarian Council of EU Presidency According to Respondents (2014)

Options for exerting influence – Case studies and Scientific Discussion

Sweden is a relatively small state, which maximized its bargaining power during its Council of EU Presidency. By focusing on conflict prevention and taking advantage of its recognized efforts in the matter, it successfully employed framing, diplomatic tactics and timing. For this to work an actor must remain observant of possible interpretations and actively construct the norm within a foreseeable period, adjust it to the evolving context and meet expectations, while existence of a political document with guiding principles remains crucial. Sweden’s actions consisted of:

  • Distribution of an Action Plan in the MS capitals
  • Informal contacts in consideration of backing up the proposal by other MS (Finland, Germany, Italy)
  • Avoiding putting too much effort on partners with little interest or alternative visions
  • Utilization of competition for power within EU institutions
  • Good personal communication, distribution of materials
  • Counting on the Council Secretariat for achieving broad acceptance and expertise
  • Avoiding over-institutionalized forms of shaping the policy proposals

Poland attempted to secure membership prospects for Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova already in 2003, but bumped into Spain and France, which were competing for financing with an agenda on the South (bg must step in to improve prospects). Instead, Poland advocated a separate track in the ENP, found supporters in the face of Czechia and Sweden and faced no constraints from southern member states. Yet, Poland did not manage to make full use of the V4 regional block in the effort sharing towards the Eastern Partnership track, as well as of the existing human capital in the EU institutions, which could have compensated the lack of diplomatic experience. Poland’s turning into an extension of the Franco-German duo through the Weimar triangle played a significant role in the advancement of the inclusiveness, democracy and reconciliation agenda towards Ukraine.

The two cases reveal that the “uploading” of domestic issues and problems onto the European agenda might play a vital role in the successful chairmanship of the European Union, as well as provide a boost for the foreign policy. While Brexit has functioned as a catalyst of an accelerated preparation process, domestic agenda setting remains fluid due to the necessary stabilization of party dynamics and actors interests. Yet, as can be seen from the empiric material, there are substantial overlaps between the domestic priorities in Bulgaria, as well as the preferences of respondents towards a potential agenda for a Council of EU Presidency. While respondents have chosen the ENP as a second most vital priority, their preferences reveal considerations toward sectoral policies such as Anti-Corruption, the Energy Union, Banking Union, Education, Security and Defense. Besides tackling corruption, the Energy and Banking Unions, immediate problems such as economic restructuring and independence of media seem to be most important domestically. Albeit limited in scope and outreach, this poll could serve as a legitimization of the real Council of EU agenda, esp. since public ownership is a prerequisite for a successful policy cycle.

Separately, the statements could abridge the two agendas with the Neighbourhood[xxv]. The parallel between Bulgaria and Ukraine includes not only the protests against the dysfunctional, captured state, resp. the continuous necessity of enforcing anti-corruption rules, but also the energy dependence to Moscow. The fact that people have seen protests as a viable alternative to political participation means only that their inclusion in policy-making can subdue such emotions. Already then the negative stance towards Russia could explain why far-right parties are not considered as democracy-enabling actors. The potential of the Council of EU Presidency as an interface between the nation state and the post-sovereign, supranational institutions is seen as high by only half of the respondents, which can be explained with the general negative stances towards domestic governance. The ENP is seen is difficult to implement possibly because the ownership of its implementation is shared between (some) of the member states, as well as DG Near of the European Commission, the European External Action Service, as well as diplomatic representations and NGOs in Brussels. Nevertheless, a majority of the respondents believe that the Enlargement towards the Eastern Partnership is indeed possible. More of them do also foresee beneficial effects of market integration on both sides of the equation. A rise in expenditures for land and maritime security is not preferred though.

Towards a focus on the Eastern Partnership through Externalization of Domestic Solutions

The vital question remains how to bridge domestic preferences with the Neighbourhood through the Council of EU Presidency and turn these into concrete legislative proposals or initiatives. With specific regards to the topic, one sixth of the respondents saw the ENP as a necessary focus of the Presidency. The section will group the analysis in three categories – good governance, energy security and economics.

Corruption continues to be the most endemic issues, as Bulgaria is the single member state that is still scrutinized by the post-accession conditionality of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. The country fails to address vested interests, the consistency and independence of the judiciary, the lack of effective prosecution and conviction of organized criminal groups. Of utmost importance remain therefore emblematic convictions of higher officials and politicians that can foster the credible and impartial rule of law. Bulgaria should concentrate on domestic resource mobilization, transparent procurement, fighting conflict of interest, nepotism, as well as the shortening of the Chief Prosecutor’s term of office (to 1 year). After the completion of the CVM mandate, the lessons learned should be applied vigorously in the Eastern Partnership. As a holder of the Presidency, Bulgarian authorities should advocate that the CVM be included in the programming of the ENP and engage directly on spot to train non-state actors. Media ownership transparency should be increased in lieu of uncovering the interests behind the content in domestic media. Last, but not least, hate speech limitation domestically must be combined with a harsh rhetoric against Turkey’s disrespect for human rights and political freedoms.

Through diversification and improved efficiency energy security remains high on the agenda of the EU and its 2020 targets. Even if gas consumption is falling, dependence on external suppliers such as Russia (32,4%), Norway (26,7%), Algeria (13,0%), Qatar (11%) continues[xxvi]. With South Stream having fortified the Russo-Turkish friendship, the question over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict becomes a litmus test for EU’s diplomacy. Despite the fact that Armenia is in the Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia continues to provide arms to Azerbaijan bought through gas exports. Hence, the lowering of gas prices and diversification of suppliers in Bulgaria can happen only when the conflict is brought to a halt. Bulgarian authorities could use the prisoner’s dilemma tactics and backup their claims for non-discriminatory access from Russia with the alternative scenario of supply through Azerbaijan. If necessary, they could launch a domestic initiative for partial revival of the Four Spaces with Russia (e.g. establishing R&D networks) since the federation holds the biggest depot of resources and is a large polluter. Removal of sanctions, albeit existent in the discussions, should be subjected to the solution of the separatist tendencies in Ukraine and the respect of the Minsk Commitments. When it comes to energy efficiency, the launch of centers for free public consultations on improving household energy and resource efficiency, building’s sanitation, procuring shared renewable energy installations, establishing bio, shared and circular economy business should be created in each large regional city. With regards to traditional security, rebuffing the naval fleet and the training of asylum seekers and refugees to work in the agricultural sector, handcrafts and small businesses could ensure a better stance in negotiations with the non-EU neighbours.

Economic diversification beyond IT services remains a problematic issues and continues to lead to significant brain-drain of engineers, natural and social scientists. On one hand the lack of any significant added-value manufacturing leads to an opportunity cost for the economy and on the other, the market rationale leads to deprivation of the domestic consumer of local bio-produce, which is sold as “bio” in other member states and substituted with greenhouse grown plants. Tax breaks for investments in added value and high-tech sectors, as well as state subventions for bio- and circular economy initiatives (e.g. repair services, eco-industry, production of solar panels, electric vehicles, autonomous agricultural, processing and recycling machinery) must be complemented with increased efforts at improved domestic resource mobilization (e.g. issuing VAT bills). The creation of industrial research center(s) with focus on sustainable transportation and housing components and turning waste into resources could make use of the well-qualified labour in the Eastern Partnership and forge important ties. During its EU presidency, Bulgaria should attempt to redefine EU’s own resources by advocating the adoption of a Tobin Tax on financial transactions (that could compensate the clampdown of KTB) that would expand to DCFTA members, so as to consolidate the banking sector and avoid scenarios such as the banking crisis in Moldova. Additionally, it should propagate the establishment of an environmental customs union that includes DCFTA members, stimulates the adoption of EU’s regulatory patterns from trade partners and provides new revenues to EU’s budget from non-compliant actors. Naturally, accession the Eurozone and the Banking Union, improved economic and fiscal surveillance of the neighbours and maximization of the New Silk Road opportunities should also remain as priorities.


The historic junction between Bulgaria, the Eastern Partnership and Russia has continued into modern times and has transformed into a competition for integration of the countries between EU and Russia. The common history, cultural, linguistic and theological ties between Bulgaria and the Eastern partners of EU could be utilized by shaping the interface between identity, institutions and actors’ interests and framing it within EU’s regulatory integration. The empiric material of this paper reveals substantial overlaps between the preferences for domestic priorities and an agenda for the Presidency. As the case studies reveal, with adequate outreach to partners and coalition-building domestic problems can be transformed into a policy agenda for the Council of EU Presidency that Bulgaria will hold in the first half of 2018. The subsequent analysis frames the existing problems in three categories – good governance, energy security and economics and proposes policy initiatives that are relevant both domestically and for the Eastern Partnership branch of EU’s multivariate foreign policy.

[i] Profile: 77% of the respondents were Bulgarian citizens and 23% – citizens of foreign countries. The majority were in or had completed the tertiary cycle of their education.

[ii] The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, Ted Hopf, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), pp.195

[iii] Ibid. pp. 174

[iv] Collective Identity Formation and the International State, Alexander Wendt, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 389

[v] Casier, T. (2008). The New Neighbours of the European Union: The Compelling Logic of Enlargement? In J. DeBardeleben, The Boundaries of EU Enlargement: Finding a place for the Neighbours (pp. 19-33). Palgrave, p.28

[vi] They transcend material means and rely much more on people-to-people contacts. Examples include interparliamentary forums, academic exchange and research networks, confederalization of NGO structures, etc. See Sebenius, J. K. (2009). Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiations analysis and epistemic communities. International Organization / Volume 46 / Issue 01 / December 1992, pp 323 – 365, DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300001521, Published online: 22 May 2009 , 323-365.

[vii] Andreatta, F. (2011). The European Union’s International Relations: A Theoretical View. In C. Hill, & M. Smith, International Relations and the European Union. Oxford University Press.

[viii] Sedelmeier, F. S. (2002). Theoritizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. Journal of of European Public Policy, 9:4, 500-528, , p. 503.

[ix] Cohen, L. J. (2008). The Europeanization of ‘Defective Democracies’ in the Western Balkans: Pre-accession challenges to democratic consolidation. In J. DeBardeleben, The Boundaries of EU Enlargement. Finding a Place for the Neighbours (pp. 205-222). Palgrave.

[x] Accession requires the adoption of primary law of the treaties and respect of the Copenhagen criteria.

[xi] Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern

and Southern Neighbours, 03.2013,

[xii] See EU/Russia: The four “common spaces”,

[xiii] European Neighbourhood Policy: History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures

Edzard Wesselink & Ron Boschma, 10.13, pp. 9-11

[xiv] Langbein, J., & Wolczyk, K. (2011). Convergence without membership? The impact of the European Union in the neighbourhood: evidence from Ukraine. Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 19, Issue 6, 2012 , pages 863-881.

[xv] Langbein, J. (2013). Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik. In E. Stratenschulte, Grenzen der Integration: Europas strategische Ansätye für die Nachbarregionen (pp. 29-55). Nomos, p.39.

[xvi] Review of the ENP, EEAS, 11.2015,

[xvii] Landaburu, E. (2006). From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are there Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement? Retrieved from CEPS Policy Brief No. 95:, p.3

[xviii] Lavenex, S. (2011). EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, 11:4, 680-700, DOI: 10.1080/1350176042000248098 , 680-700, p.694

[xix] Browning, C. S., & Joenniemi, P. (2008). The European Neighbourhood Policy and Why the Northern Dimension Matters. In DeBardeleben, The Boundaries of EU Enlargement: Finding a Place for the Neigbours. Palgrave Macmillan.

[xx] See Chad Damro, Market Power Europe, University of Edinburgh / Europa Institute, 2011

[xxi] See Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in. Terms?* IAN MANNERS. University of Kent at Canterbury. JCMS 2002 Volume 40. Number 2. pp. 235–58

[xxii] Mihăilescu, e. a. (2008). Studying Peoples in the People’s Democracies II: Socialist Era Anthropology in South-East Europe. Münster: LIT Verlag, p.148

[xxiii] Karachanak, S. e. (2012). Bulgarians vs the other European populations: a mitochondrial DNA perspective. Retrieved from Int J Legal Med (2012) 126:497–503, p. 497-8

[xxiv] The only explicit mention is of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute, see Shared Vision, Common Action:

A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 06.2016, pp. 54

[xxv] Due to the limited size of the paper, the discussion of the results will include only an analysis of these that have a correlation with the topic.

[xxvi] EuroStat. (2013, May). Natural gas consumption statistics. Retrieved from


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